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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
& CONCESSION THEORY
STEFAN J. PADFIELD*
ABSTRACT
This Essay examines three related propositions: (1) Voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) fails to effectively advance the agenda of a
meaningful segment of CSR proponents; (2) None of the three dominant
corporate governance theories—director primacy, shareholder primacy,
or team production theory—support mandatory CSR as a normative matter;
and, (3) Corporate personality theory, specifically concession theory, can
be a meaningful source of leverage in advancing mandatory CSR in the
face of opposition from the three primary corporate governance theories.
In examining these propositions, this Essay makes the additional claims
that Citizens United: (A) supports the proposition that corporate personality theory matters; (B) undermines one of the key supports of the shareholder wealth maximization norm; and (C) highlights the political nature
of this debate. Finally, I note that the Supreme Court’s recent Hobby Lobby
decision does not undermine my CSR claims, contrary to the suggestions
of some commentators.

*

Professor, University of Akron School of Law (B.A., Brown University; J.D., University of Kansas). A draft of this Essay was presented at the AALS Section on SocioEconomics’ Open Forum on Socio Economics on January 5, 2014, a faculty workshop at
Valparaiso University Law School on March 21, 2014, The University of Toledo College
of Law on April 3, 2014, and a Conference and Micro-Symposium on Competing Theories of Corporate Governance, sponsored by the Lowell Milken Institute for Business
Law and Policy at the UCLA School of Law, on April 12, 2014. My thanks to all the
participants for their helpful comments. Particular thanks to Robert Ashford for inviting
me to participate in the AALS forum, Jeremy Telman for inviting me to the Valparaiso
workshop and presenting my draft to the participants, Stephen Bainbridge for inviting me
to participate in the UCLA conference, and to Margaret Blair and Lyman Johnson for
additional helpful comments.
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Any model that commands the loyalty of one or more generations of
scholars doubtless has more than a grain of truth.1
[P]ublic opinion ... ultimately makes law ....2
INTRODUCTION
This Essay was written in response to an invitation to participate in a
“Conference and Micro-Symposium on Competing Theories of Corporate
Governance” sponsored by the Lowell Milken Institute for Business Law
and Policy at the UCLA School of Law (the “Symposium”).3 The particular theories of corporate governance under consideration were director
primacy, shareholder primacy, and team production. Invitees were asked
to “define the competing models, critique them, and explore their implications for various important legal doctrines.”4 Specifically, I was asked by
Stephen Bainbridge to participate as part of a panel on the “Implications
for Corporate Purpose,” which was to “explore whether the competing
models have descriptively accurate and normatively appealing implications for the corporate purpose (a.k.a., stakeholder or corporate social
responsibility) debate.”5 As will be explained in more detail below, my
answer to the first part of this question is that the director primacy and
team production models appear to have descriptively accurate implications
for corporate purpose, at least from the perspective of the current corporate law status quo, because they both locate control within the board of
directors, and neither requires a shift from shareholder wealth maximization to stakeholder primacy or corporate social responsibility (CSR) as the
goal of control.6 However, I argue that all three of the primary models of

1

Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003).
2
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1145, 1148 (1932).
3
Letter from Stephen Bainbridge, William D. Warren Distinguished Professor of
Law, UCLA School of Law (June 3, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bainbridge
Letter].
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
I note that many commentators and judges use “shareholder primacy” when they
likely mean “shareholder wealth maximization.” Frequently, this is not a significant
problem given the context, but it is worth noting that “shareholder primacy” is best
understood as referring to the identification of shareholders as the locus of control of the
corporation, while “shareholder wealth maximization” is best understood as a goal of
corporate governance independent of which group holds power. See Bainbridge, supra
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corporate governance have less normatively appealing implications—at
least from the perspective of those who favor a mandatory form of corporate social responsibility. In light of this, I conclude that proponents of
mandatory CSR should turn to corporate personality theory, particularly
concession theory, to provide support for their agenda, and I point to the
Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United decision as an example of the current practical relevance of corporate personality theory.
Following this Introduction, Part I of this Essay provides an overview
of the three competing theories of corporate governance as indicated
above. In addition, I include a brief discussion of managerialism because I
believe, along with many others, that there are still many corporations
where the CEO reigns supreme. Part II then discusses corporate social
responsibility, ultimately defining the concept in a way that challenges the
hegemony of the previously described theories of corporate governance. In
Part III, I then discuss the primary corporate personality theories—
including concession theory, aggregate theory, and real entity theory—
which I have previously aligned with the various theories of corporate
governance described in Part I.7 Part IV combines all of the foregoing to
argue that anyone favoring mandatory corporate social responsibility
should also support concession theory because it is the theory that most
empowers the state to mandate socially responsible behavior on the part of
corporations. Finally, Part V addresses some foreseeable criticisms of my
argument, and the last Part provides concluding remarks.
I. THE COMPETING THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means published their famous book,
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, wherein they identified
the agency problem created by the separation of ownership from control in
public corporations as the primary focus of corporate governance. 8 As
Brian Cheffins has noted: “The primary function of corporate governance
in the United States has been to address the managerial agency cost problem
note 1, at 574 (“Although often used interchangeably, the terms ‘shareholder primacy’
and ‘shareholder wealth maximization’express distinct concepts.”).
7
See Stefan J. Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation: More Than a Nexus-of-Contracts,
114 W. VA. L. REV. 209 (2011); Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory
in the Supreme Court's Campaign Finance Cases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 831 (2013);
Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327 (2014).
8
See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate
Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 605 (2001) (“The history of corporate
governance ‘reform’begins with Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’s ‘The Modern Corporation and Private Property’....”).

2015]

CSR & CONCESSION THEORY

5

that afflicts publicly traded companies with dispersed share ownership. Berle
and Means threw the spotlight on this type of agency cost problem—using
different nomenclature—in their famous 1932 book ....”9
However, it was arguably not until 1976, when Melvin Eisenberg published The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis that modern
corporate governance theory took off.10 Brian Cheffins attributes the delay
to “changing market conditions and a deregulation trend that provided
executives with unprecedented managerial discretion as the 20th century
drew to a close.”11 In response to this, “Eisenberg challenged the insiderdominated boards of the day, positing that the modern board should serve as
an independent monitor that works to safeguard shareholder interests.”12
A related timeline begins with Ronald Coase’s 1937 article, The Nature
of the Firm,13 which “characterized the boundaries of the firm as the range
9

Brian R. Cheffins, The Corporate Governance Movement, Banks and the Financial
Crisis, THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
FINANCIAL REGULATION (Jan. 27, 2014, 9:18 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov
/2014/01/27/the-corporate-governance-movement-banks-and-the-financial-crisis/. I note
that I, too, am focusing on publicly traded corporations. Private or closely held corporations
pose separate issues.
10
See Usha Rodrigues, A Conflict Primacy Model of the Public Board, 2013 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1051, 1054 (2013) [hereinafter Rodrigues, Conflict Primacy] (“Melvin Eisenberg’s revolutionary vision of the board as independent monitor now dominates corporate
governance.”) (citing MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976)); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 53 (2012) (“Although the modern understanding of the board’s
role and function has no single parent, if one were to insist on finding someone to whom
to give the bulk of the credit—or blame—the leading candidate probably would be Professor Melvin Eisenberg.”).
11
Brian R. Cheffins, The Corporate Governance Movement, Banks and the Financial
Crisis (Univ. of Cambridge, European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No.
232, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2365738.
12
Rodrigues, Conflict Primacy, supra note 10, at 1056. Cf. id. at 1059 (“Developments in the 1970s ranging from the Penn Central Railroad bankruptcy and Watergate
scandal to the birth of the corporate social responsibility movement led to the support for
empowering independent directors.”).
13
R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). Margaret Blair and
Lynn Stout explain: 
One of the central questions in economic theory is: Why do firms exist?
... In the wake of Ronald Coase's seminal piece on the nature of the
firm, the literature on this question has developed along three main paths,
each of which focuses on a different aspect of organizing productive activities. The first path explores contracting problems that arise when
one actor hires another to act on her behalf (the principal-agent problem).
The second path examines problems associated with coordinating productive activities where it is too costly to write and enforce complete
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of exchanges over which the market system was superseded and resource
allocation was accomplished instead by authority and direction.” 14 This
was ultimately followed by the 1976 article of Michael Jensen and William
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,15 which “substituted, for Coase’s conception of the firm,
the competing conception that the firm was a nexus of contracts.”16
Thus, as Stephen Bainbridge put it in his letter announcing his Symposium: “Corporate law and economics scholarship initially relied mainly on
agency cost and nexus of contracts models.”17 In recent years, however,
“various scholars have built on those foundations to construct three competing models of corporate governance: director primacy, shareholder
primacy, and team production.”18 These models all seek to identify, as a
normative and/or positive matter, (1) where the locus of control over the
corporation does and/or should reside, and (2) toward what end that control is and/or should be exercised.19 The following sub-parts will examine
these models, along with managerialism, in greater detail.

contracts, focusing especially on the role played by property rights as a
solution for closing contractual gaps (the property rights approach).
The third path considers the role hierarchy may play in policing against
shirking problems that may arise in coordinating team production (the
team production approach).
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 257–58 (1999).
14
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 820 (1999).
15
3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
16
Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 822. Cf. Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 319 n.189
(noting that “[t]he idea that a firm is a ‘nexus of contracts’is usually traced to Alchian &
Demsetz” but also noting that “Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen may have been the first
to have used the phrase”) (citing Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Eugene
F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON.
301, 302 (1983)).
17
Bainbridge Letter, supra note 3.
18
Id.
19
See generally Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 605.
Any model of corporate governance must answer two basic sets of
questions: (1) Who decides? In other words, which corporate constituency possesses ultimate decisionmaking power? (2) When the ultimate
decisionmaker, whoever it may be, is presented with a zero sum game
in which it must prefer the interests of one corporate constituency over
those of all others, whose interests prevail?”
Id.
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A. Director Primacy
Stephen Bainbridge is most frequently associated with the director
primacy model of corporate governance. 20 Director primacy posits that
control of the corporation rests with the board of directors, and that this
control is to be used to maximize shareholder wealth.21 As a positive matter, it appears clear that state corporate law does indeed place control over
the corporation into the hands of the board of directors.22 As Usha Rodrigues has noted: “In the 1970s corporate codes were amended to add that
the corporation is managed by ‘or under the direction of’ the board of
directors—a nod to the changed reality of corporate America.”23 However,
Usha Rodrigues has also recently pointed out that the ultimate day-to-day
control may actually be better described as managerial. 24 Furthermore,
while the law nominally elevates shareholder wealth maximization as the
goal of corporate governance, cases like A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v.
Barlow (upholding board’s decision to donate money to Princeton University in face of shareholder challenge), 25 Shlensky v. Wrigley (upholding
board’s decision not to install lights at Wrigley Field despite shareholder’s
evidence that the team was losing money due to the decision and that the
decision was motivated primarily by the board’s feelings about the sanctity of daytime baseball and concerns about the surrounding community),26
and even Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (forcing corporation to pay out dividends to shareholders rather than use the money to benefit nonshareholders)27 make clear that the deference granted directors to choose
the course of action taken to pursue creation of shareholder wealth under
20

Bainbridge Letter, supra note 3 (“In Stephen Bainbridge’s director primacy model,
the board of directors is not a mere agent of the shareholders, but rather is a sui generis
body whose powers are ‘original and undelegated.’”).
21
See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 550.
22
Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1653–54 (2013) (“In the context of antitakeover defenses,
[board] insulation advocates have thus far prevailed.”).
23
Rodrigues, Conflict Primacy, supra note 10, at 1086 .
24
Id. at 1056 (“Despite the central role the board plays in statutes, in practice the
CEO and other executives have long dominated corporate life.”).
25
98 A.2d 581, 585 (N.J. 1953), appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953). Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 561 n.70 (“In Barlow, the court broadly endorsed the corporate
social responsibility doctrine. As I have argued elsewhere, however, Barlow’s result is
not inconsistent with the wealth maximization norm and, in any event, represents the
minority view among decided cases.”) (citing Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting NonShareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 979 (1992)).
26
237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
27
170 N.W. 668, 685 (Mich. 1919).
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the business judgment rule makes shareholder wealth “satisfaction” a
more apt descriptor.28 The reason I cite Dodge v. Ford here as an example
of how much freedom boards have to ignore shareholder wealth maximization is because I believe that opinion can fairly be read as standing for
the proposition that Henry Ford would have been free to deny his shareholders dividends and use the cash on hand for “the primary purpose of
benefiting others”29 if he had only put forth even a modicum of effort in
defending his plan as good for business, which should have been quite
easy in light of Barlow and Shlensky,30 as opposed to defiantly defending
his right to allocate corporate assets purely for the benefit of his workers
and consumers.31 All of which is to say that, so long as the corporation
creates sufficient wealth for shareholders to keep them satisfied enough to
avoid revolt, the board will be free to pursue any number of non-shareholderwealth-maximizing paths.32 However, as will be discussed in more detail
below, this is still a far cry from mandatory CSR.
28

Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 602 n.269 (“I concede that the business judgment
rule has the effect of insulating the board of directors from liability when they put the
interests of nonshareholder constituencies ahead of those of shareholders, but deny that
that is the rule’s intent.”) (discussing Wrigley).
29
Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
30
While Barlow and Shlensky were decided years after Ford, the willingness of the
courts in those cases to protect corporate decision making from shareholder challenge
suggests it would not have taken much for the Ford court to do the same. However, the
timing of the cases may distinguish them as well.
31
Cf. Kent Greenfield & John E. Nilsson, Gradgrind’s Education: Using Dickens and
Aristotle to Understand (and Replace?) the Business Judgment Rule, 63 BROOK. L. REV.
799, 814 (1997) (“In the press, Ford had been defiant, proclaiming his decision to reinvest in the company ‘[in order] to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the
greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes.’”) (quoting
Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. at 671).
32
Some have argued that it is impossible for management to merely satisfy shareholders in a competitive market. This proposition, however, is highly contested. See
Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L.
REV. 757, 763–64 (1995) (exploring path dependency theory of corporate law in which
inefficient legal rules persist due to network externalities); Michal Barzuza, Noise
Adopters in Corporate Governance, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 627, 627 (2013) (“‘[N]oise
adopters,’ namely firms whose corporate governance is determined by non-substantive
factors such as attorneys’ boilerplates, network externalities, and mere inertia, provide
camouflage to insiders with a strong preference for entrenchment.”); John W. Cioffi,
Book Review, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 763, 764 (2004) (reviewing MARK J. ROE, THE
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE
IMPACT (2003)) (“[Mark Roe] argues that incorporation of political forces in the analysis
provides a fuller and more robust account of cross-national divergence in corporate
governance systems and ownership than do purely legal and economic theories of corporate governance regimes.”). Cf. Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 252–53, 282 (“[S]o long
as each member of the coalition receives even a modest premium over his opportunity
cost, he has incentive to remain in the team.”).
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As for whether placing control in the hands of the board is best as a
normative matter, Lucian Bebchuk has recently made a compelling argument that shareholders at the very least deserve more power than they
currently have.33 Furthermore, whether shareholder wealth maximization
is normatively the best goal of corporate governance has been debated
extensively.34 For purposes of this Essay, I am asking what the implications are of adopting mandatory corporate social responsibility as the goal,
and thus I leave the normative debate to others for now. In other words, I
posit that given the number of scholars and other commentators who have
advocated for some form of mandatory CSR, the mandatory CSR model of
corporate governance deserves to be taken seriously. 35 Furthermore, if
none of the current primary models of corporate governance can accommodate mandatory CSR as a normative matter, then there may be reason
to question the hegemony of these models.
To sum up on director primacy, while there is good evidence to support the theory as a positive matter, there are also strong arguments suggesting corporations operate differently in the real world. More importantly
for purposes of this Essay, director primacy does not appear to provide
normative support for mandatory CSR,36 and thus we must look elsewhere
33

See Bebchuk, supra note 22, at 1637 (“[T]he available empirical evidence provides
no support for the claim that board insulation increases overall value in the long term. To
the contrary, the evidence favors the view that board insulation at current or higher levels
does not serve the long-term interests of companies and their shareholders.”).
34
See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist
Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 100 (2008) (“A
continuing and longstanding debate has been waged in corporate law scholarship among
those who favor shareholder primacy, those who favor management discretion, and those
who believe that corporations have a social responsibility to other constituencies, such as
the corporation’s employees, and the wider public interest.”).
35
See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 585 (1992) (“Having established a theoretical justification for the new constituency statutes and their relationship to
emerging case law, I will then in Part III offer a two-part model for enforcement of these
statutes.”); Gary von Stange, Corporate Social Responsibility Through Constituency
Statutes: Legend or Lie?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 461, 490 (1994) (“If legislatures truly wish
to accomplish corporate social responsibility through constituency statutes, then legislatures must ... expressly mandate consideration for nonshareholder constituencies ....”); Marleen
A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate
Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 902 (1993) (“In this [a]rticle,
I focus on expanding the existing fiduciary duties of directors to encompass obligations
to employees.”). Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 550 (“Any model that commands the
loyalty of one or more generations of scholars doubtless has more than a grain of truth.”).
36
See Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy Is About the Allocation of Power, Not How
It Used, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Aug. 2, 2012, 10:57 AM), http://www.profes
sorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/08/director-primacy-is-about-the-alloca
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if we are to answer the question of where proponents of mandatory CSR
can find theoretical support for their position. To that end, we next examine the theories of team production, shareholder primacy, and managerialism.
B. Team Production
Like the director primacy theory of corporate governance, the team production theory locates control of the corporation in the board of directors.37 However, team production theory posits the goal of that control to
be the mediation of the competing interests of the various relevant stakeholders.38 Thus, like director primacy, team production theory seems to
capture the legal reality of board controland may provide a better description of the practical reality of how that control is implemented, again subject to the claims of managerialism regarding personal enrichment by
those in control.39
Stephen Bainbridge has noted that, “[a]lthough team production is not
explicitly normative, many commentators regard it as at least being compatible with stakeholder theorists who promote corporate social responsibility.”40
Although Blair and Stout tend to downplay the normative implications
of their model, they acknowledge that it “resonates” with the views of
progressive corporate legal scholarship. They differ from the progressive wing of the corporate law academy mainly on positive grounds.
Many progressives believe that corporate directors currently do not take
sufficient account of nonshareholder constituency interests and that legal
reform is necessary. In contrast, Blair and Stout believe that corporate
directors do take such interests into account and the current law is adequate in this regard.41

However, Margaret Blair has clarified that “[t]he team production argument
is that all the parties will be better off if they delegate decision-making to a
tion-of-power-not-how-it-used.html (“[D]irector primacy is about the allocation of power
within the firm, and has little to say about how that power is to be used (other than requiring that it be used to maximize shareholder wealth).”).
37
See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 280–81 (“[T]he directors are trustees
for the corporation itself—mediating hierarchs whose job is to balance team members’
competing interests in a fashion that keeps everyone happy enough that the productive
coalition stays together.”).
38
Id.
39
Cf. Donald E. Schwartz, Book Review: In Search of Corporate Soul: The Structure
of the Corporation: By Melvin Aron Eisenberg, 87 YALE L.J. 685, 687 (1978) (“Eisenberg finds ... managerialism is dangerous because management’s interests may conflict with
those of the stockholders.”).
40
Bainbridge Letter, supra note 3.
41
Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 593–94.
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non-team member. But it does not say that the decision-maker must pursue
CSR goals.”42 In other words, to the extent I am viewing the implications of
the primary corporate governance models through the lens of those who seek
mandatory CSR, team production theory still leaves much to be desired.
C. Shareholder Primacy
The shareholder primacy model differs from director primacy and
team production theory by arguing that shareholders, rather than the board
of directors, should serve as the locus of control for corporations—or at
least hold more control than they currently do.43 Not surprisingly, shareholder primacy agrees with director primacy that the goal of corporate
governance should be shareholder wealth maximization. 44 Lucian Bebchuk
recently authored a compelling defense of shareholder primacy, wherein
he addressed criticisms coming from those who argue that it is best to
insulate directors from shareholder power:
Although insulation advocates often lump them together, there are two
different mechanisms through which shareholder pressure is alleged to
produce long-term costs .... I refer to [the first] claim—that activists
with short-term orientation urge actions that are profitable in the short
term but value-reducing in the longer term—as the myopic activists
claim .... [A] complementary claim [is] that fear of shareholder intervention (or even removal by shareholders) in the event that management fails to deliver good short-run outcomes leads management itself
to initiate and take actions that are profitable in the short term but detrimental in the long term. I refer to this claim as the counterproductive
accountability claim.45

42

Email from Margaret Blair to author (Jan. 15, 2014, 9:57 PM) (on file with author).
See generally Bebchuk, supra note 22, at 1644 (“I would like to stress that I do not
argue—nor do I believe—that the optimal level of board insulation is zero. The board
insulation view—the view that I do seek to challenge—refers throughout to the view that
existing or higher levels of insulation are beneficial in the long term.”); Bainbridge Letter, supra note 3 (“Scholars such as Lucian Bebchuk working with this model are generally concerned with issues of managerial accountability to shareholders. In recent years,
these scholars have been closely identified with federal reforms designed to empower
shareholders.”).
44
Cf. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”); Mark
J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001) (noting that “[s]hareholder wealth maximization is usually
accepted as the appropriate goal in American business circles”).
45
Bebchuk, supra note 22, at 1658.
43
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Bebchuk then proceeded to examine various empirical studies relevant
to the claims and concluded:
Overall, analyzing the publicly available data on stock returns provides
no support for the myopic activists claim that activist intervention
makes shareholders of target companies worse off in the long term ....
[Likewise], the counterproductive accountability claim advanced by insulation advocates is not supported by the empirical evidence. To the
contrary, the existing body of evidence supports the view that existing
or higher levels of board insulation are value-decreasing both in the
short term and the long term.46

Thus, Bebchuk has made a strong argument for shareholder primacy as
providing a better normative model of who should control the corporation.47 However, Usha Rodrigues has noted that “the shareholders themselves cannot be in charge of the corporation, or they lose the benefits of
the separation of ownership and control.”48 In addition, Stephen Bainbridge
has noted that, “[a]t the most basic level, the mechanical difficulties of
achieving consensus amongst thousands of decisionmakers impede shareholders from taking an active role.” 49 Finally, the shareholder primacy
goal of shareholder wealth maximization is subject to the same criticisms as
it is under director primacy.50 Most importantly for purposes of this Essay,
46

Id. at 1676, 1686.
Board insulation eliminates or substantially weakens ... incentives to
serve shareholders. Thus, it can be expected to increase slack, empire
building, excessive pay, and other forms of private benefits. It can also
be expected to make insiders more inclined to act in ways that are beneficial to or convenient for themselves but costly to shareholders. The
evidence indicates that board insulation does indeed have such adverse
effects .... In addition, there is evidence that board insulation enables managers to increase their own benefits.
Id. at 1679–80.
47
One might argue that current shareholder voting rights, along with the right to sue
directors for breach of fiduciary duty, make shareholder primacy compelling as a positive
matter as well. However, “[c]areful analysis reveals … that these rights are so limited as to
be almost nonexistent.” Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 320.
48
Rodrigues, Conflict Primacy, supra note 10, at 1058. Cf. United States v. Milwaukee
Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905) (justifying piercing the
corporate veil to hold shareholders personally liable for the debts of the corporation by
stating that “[i]f any general rule can be laid down … it is that a corporation will be looked
upon as a legal entity as a general rule … until sufficient reason to the contrary appears”).
49
Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 557.
50
Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 908–13 (responding to the claim that increasing shareholder power may have
adverse effects on stakeholders); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 729–31 (same).
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the shareholder wealth maximization norm of shareholder primacy leaves
no room for mandatory CSR as a normative matter.
D. Managerialism
While managerialism was not one of the corporate governance models
identified for discussion at the Symposium, the reality of board capture by
inside management makes the perspective worth at least mentioning here.51
Essentially, managerialism posits that corporate executives, particularly
the CEO, are the true bearers of control in the corporation. Usha Rodrigues
recently advanced this position in her paper, A Conflict Primacy Model of
the Public Board, wherein she notes: “Despite the central role the board
plays in statutes, in practice the CEO and other executives have long dominated corporate life.”52 This executive dominance has only been exacerbated
by what Rodrigues refers to as modern corporate law “fetishizing independence” among directors, thereby decreasing entity-specific expertise on boards
with concomitant increased dependence on corporate insiders.53 In addition:
The American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility
noted that many aspects of an outside director's role reflect a dependence on senior management: “Typically, senior management plays a
significant part in the selection of directors, in proposing the compensation for directors, in selecting their committee assignments, in setting
agendas for their meetings, and in evaluating their performance.”54

It is worth noting that Stephen Bainbridge himself has acknowledged
this reality to some extent.55
51

Cf. LUIGI ZINGALES, PREVENTING ECONOMISTS' CAPTURE, IN PREVENTING REGULACAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter
& David Moss eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2013) (“Regulatory capture is so pervasive
precisely because it is driven by standard economic incentives, which push even the most
well-intentioned regulators to cater to the interest of the regulated.”).
52
Rodrigues, Conflict Primacy, supra note 10, at 1056. Cf. id. at 1062 (“The average
director spends roughly twenty hours a month on the governance of his or her company.”).
53
Id. at 1053 (“By fetishizing independence, we have created boards of individuals
especially ill-suited to monitoring the corporation’s full range of work.”).
54
Id. at 1060–61.
55
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 19 (2008) (acknowledging the view that “[n]either shareholders nor directors
run the corporation; CEOs do,”and that “[m]anagerialism may have fallen out of favor as
a normative theory of corporate governance, but it remains the work-a-day world reality,”
but arguing that “the balance of power is shifting from imperial CEOs to boards”). Cf.
Noemie Bisserbe, Jeanne Whalen & Hester Plumridge, Sanofi Fires CEO as Tensions
Boil Over, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2014) (“Sanfori directors say the episode wasn’t the first
TORY
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As alluded to above, managerialism arguably exacerbates the agency
problem even more than what one might reasonably expect under director
primacy or team production.56 That is to say, the control wielded by executives can be expected to be used by the executives to enrich themselves
at the expense of shareholders and other stakeholders.57 For this reason,
Rodrigues argues for a “conflict primacy view of the board [which] makes a
virtue out of a vice by limiting the independent board’s responsibilities to
those areas where independence matters: problems of conflict of interest.”58
In light of this heightened risk of self-dealing, advocates of mandatory CSR
are unlikely to find any more support for their agenda via managerialism
than via director primacy or team production.59
Having set forth the primary theories of corporate governance, and
found them all wanting in terms of supporting mandatory CSR, we turn
now to explore corporate social responsibility in more detail before proceeding to consider corporate personality theories as a possible source of
support for advocates of mandatory CSR. Clarifying the construct of corporate social responsibility should make it easier for the reader to understand why the modern theories of corporate governance may fall short
from the perspective of advocates of mandatory CSR. The discussion will
also set the stage for an explication of how corporate personality theory
may provide the sought after theoretical support.
time they felt ill informed about [CEO] Viehbacher’s plans. Despite having general confidence in the turnaround strategy he’s pursued, they say he displayed an uncommunicative
management style that led to his abrupt ouster on Wednesday.”), available at http://on
.wsj.com/1zHXYcf.
56
See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 43, at 444 (noting “the conventional wisdom that, when managers are given great discretion over corporate investment policies,
they tend to serve disproportionately their own interests”).
57
Cf. Rodriguez, Conflict Primacy, supra note 10, at 1066 (“The evidence suggests
that ... modern boards merely rubber-stamp managerial decisions when asked to evaluate
them.”); id. at 1068 (“Professor Lawrence Mitchell notes that the advent of independent
boards has made boards overly dependent on the CEO for information and thus placed
‘the CEO in an enormously powerful position, with every incentive to present information
to the board in a light that is most favorable to him.’”) (quoting Lawrence E. Mitchell,
Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational Monopolies: The Missing Link in Corporate
Governance, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1349 (2005)).
58
Rodrigues, Conflict Primacy, supra note 10, at 1068.
59
As a positive matter, the expectation is that managers will use their power to enrich
themselves at the expense of other stakeholders. As a normative matter, there may be
room to argue that managers should be in control because they are in the best position to
balance the competing interests of stakeholders in a way not entirely opposed to CSR.
However, it is highly doubtful that, like in the case of team production theory, there exists
a clear path from managerialism to mandatory CSR. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 550
(“Managerialist models assume that top management controls the corporation, but differ
as to the interests managers should pursue.”).

2015]

CSR & CONCESSION THEORY

15

II. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
One version of the history of corporate social responsibility is provided
by Douglas Branson in his article, Corporate Governance “Reform” and
the New Corporate Social Responsibility:
The history of corporate governance “reform” … has been the postulation, by academics and others, of solutions to problems posed by the
separation of ownership from control. One subset of proposed reforms,
those of the 1970s, formed the “corporate social responsibility movement.” During that era, reformers urged governmental intervention
which, as a matter of general corporate law, would expand corporate
responsibility from primarily shareholders, to workers, consumers, suppliers, communities in which the corporation had a significant presence,
clean air, clean water, and other constituencies. At times, most particularly during the heyday of the law and economics movement, scholars
posited that the separation of ownership from control posed no problem
at all. Instead it was an efficient allocation of investor and managerial
resources. Thus, law and economics eclipsed the corporate social responsibility movement. Seldom in the annals of jurisprudence has one
jurisprudence ascended so quickly, while the one it supplanted simultaneously faded into oblivion.60

One way of thinking about corporate social responsibility is to view it
as an alternative to the previously discussed models of corporate governance
in terms of goals.61 That is to say, while both director primacy and shareholder primacy view shareholder wealth maximization as the proper goal of
corporate governance, and team production theory espouses a goal of stakeholder mediation that also does not extend to mandating social responsibility,62
60

Branson, supra note 8, at 605; see also Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations:
A Challenge in Corporate Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1038 n.1 (2013) (“Many
scholars recognize that the famous exchange of articles between Professors Berle and
Dodd was critical in launching the debate on a corporation’s social responsibility.”);
Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 561 (“Berle thought the law should put renewed emphasis on
managers’ fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth. In contrast, Dodd argued that
corporations have a ‘social service [responsibility] as well as a profit-making function.’”);
Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 303 (“By the 1950s, Berle was ready to concede that, as a
matter of law, ‘[corporate] powers [are] held in trust for the entire community.’”).
61
Cf. Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social
Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1351 (2011) (“Despite vigorous debate
since the 1930s, the notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) remains in flux.”).
62
Cf. Blair & Stout, supra note 13.
[O]ur analysis appears to parallel many of the arguments raised in recent years by the “communitarian” or “progressive” school of corporate
scholars who believe that corporate law ought to require directors to
serve not only the shareholders’ interests, but also those of employees,

16

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:001

mandatory CSR supports affirmatively elevating social responsibility over
shareholder wealth maximization in at least some cases.63 Simply put, the
CSR position is that shareholder wealth may be sacrificed if the net social
gain is positive, so that a board may defend its actions by pointing to some
accounted-for social benefit even when it demurs on the issue of shareholder wealth maximization.64
For purposes of this Essay, I am going to focus on constituency statutes
as my proxy for CSR because they represent arguably the only “positive
corporate law that directly seeks to advance the cause of CSR or constituency theory.”65 Constituency statutes arose out of the takeover boom of
the 1970s, when legislatures sought to protect local jobs and businesses by
granting boards express permission, if not a mandate, to consider interests
other than short-term shareholder value, which might otherwise be the
consumers, creditors, and other corporate “stakeholders.” We believe,
however, that our mediating hierarchy approach ... carries very different policy implications: Where progressives have argued that corporate
law ought to be reformed to make directors more accountable to stakeholders, the mediating hierarchy approach suggests that directors should
not be under direct control of either shareholders or other stakeholders.
Id. at 253–54.
63
Cf. id. at 308 n.157 (“The team production model explains how sacrificing shareholders’interests to stakeholders’can sometimes serve the interests of both groups in the
long run.”).
64
Cf. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (2002) (“Few trends could
so thoroughly undermine the very foundation of our free society as the acceptance by
corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their
shareholders as possible. This is a fundamentally subversive doctrine.”). But see Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 565 (“[O]wnership of the residual claim is not the same as ownership of the firm itself .... Hence, we can throw Friedman’s concept of ownership out the
window, along with its associated economic and ethical baggage.”).
65
Matthew T. Bodie, Nascar Green: The Problem of Sustainability in Corporations
and Corporate Law, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 491, 498 (2011) (“Other than constituency
statutes, there has been little in the positive corporate law that directly seeks to advance the
cause of CSR or constituency theory.”); see also Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer on Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe
and the United States and the Case for the Benefit Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L.
REV. 639, 653 (2013) (identifying “several examples of CSR, including corporate responsibility reporting (CR reporting), corporate codes of conduct, and constituency statutes”
as well as shareholder proposals); id. at 660 (“While most lawmakers likely had changeof-control decisions in mind when enacting constituency statutes, CSR proponents observe
that the application of constituency statutes is not necessarily limited to situations in which
the corporation is for sale ....”); Timothy L. Fort, Corporate Constituency Statutes: A
Dialectical Interpretation, 15 J.L. & COM. 257, 257 (1995) (identifying the “stakeholder
theory of corporate social responsibility [as] codified in part by state corporate constituency statutes”).
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requirement under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.66
In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court held that “when ... it became
apparent to all that the break-up of the company was inevitable ... [t]he
duty of the board ... changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the
stockholders’ benefit.”67 The statutes have been heavily criticized because
none of the stakeholders implicated could actually sue the board, and thus
the statutes basically turned into cover for insider entrenchment.68 For this
reason, I am going to focus on mandatory constituency statutes that grant
certain enforcement rights to covered stakeholders.69
In other words, in assessing the viability of the various theories discussed herein for supporting mandatory CSR, the reader may find it useful
to use mandatory constituency statutes as a relevant yardstick. If the theory
under consideration could support a mandatory constituency statute, then it
is likely a good fit for mandatory CSR more generally. I note that while
constituency statutes have been heavily criticized as inefficient, adding
stakeholder enforcement rights arguably should serve as an additional monitoring tool against management self-dealing. One possible route to accountability and enforcement via constituency statutes is to mandate stakeholder
impact statements and allow stakeholders to sue for corrections of misstatements and material omissions, with plaintiffs’ attorneys acting as private
66

506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
Id. at 182. Revlon provided a gloss on Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, which had held
that directors may consider the “impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e.,
creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally),” Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985), when deciding on defensive
measures in the face of a hostile acquisition attempt. Compare Blair & Stout, supra note
13, at 308 (“Unocal squarely rejects shareholder primacy in favor of the view that the
interests of the ‘corporation’ include the interests of nonshareholder constituencies.”) (citing
Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 954), with id. at 308 n.157 (“In [Revlon], the Delaware Supreme
Court suggested that directors could consider other constituencies’ interests only when
doing so ultimately provided some benefit to shareholders as well.”). But see generally
Lyman Johnson & Rob Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167
(2014); Mohsen Manesh, Nearing 30, Is Revlon Showing Its Age?, 71 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. ONLINE 107 (2014), http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol71/iss2
/6, (responding to Johnson & Ricca article); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert Ricca, The
Still-Dwindled Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 150 (2014), http://scholarly
commons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol71/iss3/1 (responding to Manesh article).
68
Cf. Mitchell, supra note 34, at 580.
69
Cf. von Stange, supra note 34, at 490 (1994) (“If legislatures truly wish to accomplish
corporate social responsibility through constituency statutes, then legislatures must: (1) expressly mandate consideration for nonshareholder constituencies; (2) encourage accountability of incumbent management; (3) alter the composition of the board of directors to
include nonshareholders; and (4) enable nonshareholder constituencies access to remedies.”).
67

18

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:001

attorneys general incentivized by fees.70 In addition, I qualify all the foregoing by noting that the implementation of mandatory constituency statutes
that are enforceable by stakeholders should not preclude consideration of
the shareholder wealth consequences of the relevant business decision under
consideration, nor should they preclude shareholder wealth maximizing activities simply because they are shareholder wealth maximizing.71 Finally,
70

The use of disclosure to drive changes in corporate behavior is nothing new. See
Rahim Kanani, The Future of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), FORBES (Feb. 9,
2012, 7:38 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rahimkanani/2012/02/09/the-future-of-cor
porate-social-responsibility-csr/ (“In 2000 there might have been a dozen Fortune 500
companies who issued a CSR or sustainability report. Now almost all of them do.”). Cf.
Celia Taylor, CSR—and Other—Disclosure as “Compelled Speech”: The US and the EU
Consider Very Different Approaches, THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Apr. 24, 2014, 6:00
AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/miscellaneous/csrand-other-disclosure-as-com
pelledspeech-the-us-and-the-e.html (“The fate of compelled commercial speech is the
subject of great uncertainty in the US at the moment [since] the conflict minerals rules
issued by the SEC [were] subject to many legal challenges including one based on the
First Amendment”); Celia Taylor, Conflict Minerals: On We Go: Challenge to be Heard
by Full Court, THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Nov. 21, 2014, 06:00AM), http://www.the
racetothebottom.org/home/conflict-minerals-on-we-go-challenge-to-be-heard-by-full-cou
.html (“[T]he United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed to reconsider the last ruling in the on-going dispute of … the SEC’s conflict minerals rule ….”).
One could even argue that in today’s globalized and interconnected world, the duty of
care—which requires directors to become informed of all material information reasonably
available—may already require such factors to be considered. Cf. Adam J. Sulkowski &
Sandra Waddock, Beyond Sustainability Reporting: Integrated Reporting is Practiced,
Required & More Would Be Better, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1060, 1061 (2013) (arguing that
“existing laws and related rules already require greater disclosure of data on environmental
and societal impacts than commonly understood”). Furthermore, I believe the courts have
recently demonstrated, in the context of Dodd-Frank’s advisory say-on-pay mandate, that they
can effectively keep frivolous claims to a minimum. See generally Alison Frankel, Citi
shareholders have slim chance of enforcing say-on-pay vote, REUTERS (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/04/19/citi-shareholders-have-slim-chance-of
-enforcing-say-on-pay-vote/ (“About a dozen corporations that failed say-on-pay votes in
2011 were sued in shareholder derivative actions accusing board members of breaching
their duty. Only one of those suits has so far survived a dismissal motion.”). But see
Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 558 (“Overcoming the collective action problems that prevent meaningful involvement by the corporation’s various constituencies would be difficult and costly.”).
71
See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 583 n.176 (“[T]hese statutes do not reject the traditional shareholder wealth maximization norm. Instead, they modify the norm by allowing
the board to make tradeoffs between shareholder and stakeholder interests.”).
Boards of directors sometimes face decisions in which it is possible to
make at least one corporate constituency better off without leaving any
constituency worse off. In economic terms, such a decision is Pareto efficient because it moves the firm from a Pareto inferior position to the
Pareto frontier. Other times, however, boards face a decision that
makes at least one constituency better off but leaves at least one worse
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I note that while it has been said that “[s]takeholderist models rarely focus
on control issues, but instead emphasize that shareholders should not be
the sole beneficiaries of director and officer fiduciary duties,”72 I am assuming the board will need to be the locus of control because this is the
body the regulatory state has the most direct control over.73
If we assume that constituency statutes can serve as a useful proxy for
CSR, and take seriously the criticisms levied against the effectiveness of
these statutes when unaccompanied by any sort of stakeholder enforcement mechanism (i.e., when they are not in any meaningful sense mandatory), then the failure of the primary theories of corporate governance to
provide a normative basis for strengthening these statutes serves as an
example of how these theories fail to meet the needs of proponents of
mandatory CSR. We now turn our attention to an alternative foundation
for mandatory CSR: corporate personality theory.
III. THE COMPETING THEORIES OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY
Theories of corporate personality seek to define the nature of corporations so as to provide a framework within which to determine the rights and
responsibilities of corporations vis-à-vis the rest of society.74 Thus, it may
not be fair to try to align theories of corporate personality with theories of
corporate governance, since the latter are concerned primarily with the
internal relations (primarily between the shareholders and managers) of
the corporation. However, on at least some level the distinction between
internal and external relations becomes artificial, since the internal
off. For example, imagine a decision with a payoff for one constituency
of $150 that leaves another constituency worse off by $100. As a
whole, the organization is better off by $50. In economic terms, this decision is Kaldor-Hicks efficient. With these concepts in mind, the
shareholder wealth maximization norm can be described as a bargained-for term of the board-shareholder contract by which the directors agree not to make Kaldor-Hicks efficient decisions that leave
shareholders worse off.
Id. at 583–84.
72
Id. at 550.
73
Cf. Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Status Bound: The Twentieth Century Evolution of Directors' Liability, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 63, 64 (2009) (“The board of directors is created by
the state through its corporation statute and serves as a reminder of the public nature of
the corporation.”). The distinction between theories such as director primacy and team
production, which place corporate control in the hands of the board, and theories of
corporate personality that grant the state broad discretion to use the board as a vehicle for
regulation, will be made more clear in the discussion in the next Part distinguishing real
entity theory from concession theory.
74
Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 331–33.

20

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:001

decision making frequently implicates external parties.75 Partly for this
reason, I have sought in my recent scholarship to align the dominant theories of corporate governance with the primary theories of corporate personality.76 However, in this Essay I focus on a divergence. While none of
the three primary models of corporate governance support mandatory CSR
as a normative matter, I hope to show that concession theory, one of the
three primary corporate personality theories discussed below, may do so
because of its focus on the corporation as a state creation intended to serve
society at large under the umbrella of an active and engaged regulatory
scheme—as opposed to the market-based orientation of the other models
and theories.
Specifically, the three primary theories of corporate personality are
aggregate theory, real/natural entity theory, and concession/artificial entity
theory.77 At the risk of oversimplifying, aggregate theory and real entity
theory essentially presume corporations stand in the shoes of natural persons (shareholders in the former case, and the board of directors in the
latter), and thus have available to them all the rights of natural persons in
resisting government regulation.78 Concession theory, on the other hand,
views the corporation as fundamentally a state creation, and presumes the
state has the right to regulate its creation as it sees fit.79 Thus, it is most
likely that concession theory, rather than aggregate or real entity theory,
holds the most promise for mandatory CSR as conceived herein.80 What
follows is a further explanation of each of the three theories.
75

Cf. Virginia Harper Ho, Of Enterprise Principles and Corporate Groups: Does
Corporate Law Reach Human Rights?, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 113, 113–14 (2013)
(“Corporate law ... governs the ‘internal affairs’ of discrete legal entities within a given
jurisdiction, each protected by a limited liability shield. Questions of global corporate
accountability for human rights practices have therefore been viewed as beyond its reach.
This Article challenges this accepted wisdom ....”).
76
See Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 331 (2014)
(“While one should be careful not to overstate the overlap between conceptualizations of
the corporation for purposes of constitutional and corporate governance analysis … I
have previously aligned real entity theory with the director-primacy and team-production
theories.”); Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court's Campaign Finance Cases, supra note 7, at 835 (“director-primacy/team-production theory and
‘real entity’ theory are synonymous”); Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation: More Than
A Nexus-of-Contracts, supra note 7, at 215 (“The … real entity theory arguably captures
the director-primacy view of the corporation.”).
77
Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 330.
78
Id. at 336–37.
79
Id. at 333.
80
Cf. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A
Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 767
(2005) (“[U]nder the real entity view, which is historically the dominant view of the
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A. Artificial Entity/Concession Theory
In the 1819 Supreme Court case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, Justice Marshall famously stated:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing
only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers
upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are
such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it
was created .... The objects for which a corporation is created are universally such as the government wishes to promote. They are deemed
beneficial to the country; and this benefit constitutes the consideration,
and, in most cases, the sole consideration of the grant.81

This formulation has commonly been associated with concession theory,
also known as artificial entity theory.82 As I have stated elsewhere, “of the
three traditional theories of the corporation under constitutional law ...
concession theory is the only one that legitimizes presumptive deference
to state regulation.”83 Interestingly, concession theory has no good counterpart among the primary theories of corporate governance discussed
above.84 This may be due to the fact that corporate governance theory is
primarily concerned with the internal affairs of the corporation (that is, the
allocation of power among the board and shareholders),85 and thus is arguably more focused on private ordering. However, it should also be noted
that excluding the state from analysis of the internal affairs of the corporation can also be explained as a purposeful move that shifts the debate to
the private side of the public-private divide and furthers a deregulatory
agenda consistent with the law and economics movement of the late
1970s.86 In other words, to say that the corporation is a nexus of contracts
but then ignore the state as one of the primary contracting parties assumes
many things that are likely contestable.87
corporation, CSR is normatively acceptable even when it does not contribute to the longrun welfare of the shareholders.”).
81
Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636–37 (1819).
82
See Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 332.
83
Id. at 329.
84
Id. at 330–31.
85
See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 549–50.
86
See Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 340-41 (“[N]otable
landmarks in the modern contract vs. concession ‘war’ include the emergence of the law
and economics movement in corporate law in the 1970s ....”).
87
Cf. Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling
of “Nexus of Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2011) (“A corporation is not a
contract. It is a state-created entity.”).
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At the risk of moving too far afield, I think a recent blog post by Stephen Bainbridge regarding the recently decided Hobby Lobby case might
be useful for further illuminating concession theory. 88 Hobby Lobby involved a challenge to the contraception insurance mandate of the Affordable
Care Act.89 Specifically, the for-profit corporation Hobby Lobby claimed an
exemption under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 90 Among other
things, the Court concluded that corporations have religious freedom rights.91
I was one of forty-four corporate and criminal law professors to sign
on to a brief arguing that the religious freedom rights of the owners should
not be ascribed to the corporation.92 Stephen Bainbridge raised a number
of challenges to this brief, including the following:
[M]any of the signers are associated with the corporate social responsibility
movement. In their vocational role as advocates of that view, they argue
Compare Stephen M. Bainbridge, Citizens United v. FEC: Stevens’ Pernicious Version of the Concession Theory, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 21, 2010, 4:05 PM),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/citizens-united-v
-fec-stevens-pernicious-version-of-the-concession-theory.html (“It has been over half-acentury since corporate legal theory, of any political or economic stripe, took the concession theory seriously.”), with Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7,
at 329 (“I want to ‘rehabilitate’ concession theory ... because (1) of the three traditional
theories of the corporation under constitutional law ... concession theory is the only one
that legitimizes presumptive deference to state regulation, and (2) commentators have
unduly marginalized concession theory in recent years.”).
89
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). The Supreme Court
explained:
We must decide ... whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ...
permits the United States Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) to demand that three closely held corporations provide healthinsurance coverage for methods of contraception that violate the sincerely held religious beliefs of the companies’ owners. We hold that the
regulations ... violate RFRA, which prohibits the Federal Government
from taking any action that substantially burdens the exercise of religion unless that action constitutes the least restrictive means of serving
a compelling government interest.
Id. at 2759.
90
Id.
91
See generally Stefan J. Padfield, The Role of Corporate Personality Theory in Hobby
Lobby, BUSINESS LAW PROF BLOG (July 6, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/busi
ness_law/2014/07/the-role-of-corporate-personality-theory-in-hobby-lobby.html (noting
that while Justice Alito’s majority opinion equated the closely held corporation with its
controlling shareholders, and thus granted the corporation standing to claim interference
with its free exercise rights, Justice Ginsburg argued in dissent that the corporation could
not, as an artificial entity, exercise religion).
92
Brief for Corporate and Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356).
88
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that corporations should consider the good of society when making
corporate decisions. Except it seems when … Catholic and other religiously-motivated shareholders want the corporation to address the social issue of abortion. I find all that more than just a little inconsistent.93

I believe concession theory helps explain why the positions referenced
above are not inconsistent.
I begin with two fundamental propositions: (1) the republican form of
government created by our Constitution, and of which our states are a part,
is good and worth defending; (2) the grant of corporate status can be viewed
as a subsidy from the state to further economic growth. The reason I say
the grant of corporate status can be viewed as a subsidy is because without
the limited liability shield provided by incorporation the investors/owners
would be at risk of personal liability for the debts of the business.94 Essentially, the state is shifting the cost of a certain subset of claims against the
business from the owners to the claimants (at least in those cases where
the corporation cannot satisfy the claim), and its justification for doing so
is the overall net gain generated by allowing business to operate in the
corporate form.95 However, at the same time there is a risk that the benefits of incorporation will also foster powerful factions that could undermine the very state that created the corporation in the first place.96 Thus,
the state is justified in limiting the scope of the corporate subsidy to economic activity.
Therefore, when a group of shareholders proclaim that not only should
they be allowed to benefit from the corporate form for economic gain, but
93

Stephen Bainbridge, The Odd Inconsistencies in the Corporate Law Professor Brief
in the Mandate Cases, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 29, 2014, 5:23 PM), http://
www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/01/the-odd-inconsistencies
-in-the-corporate-law-professor-brief-in-the-mandate-cases.html.
94
See Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 337 (“If one …
boils the corporation down to its shareholder owners, then one is essentially back to a
form of general partnership where all the owners are personally liable for the debts of the
business.”).
95
See Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm-from Nature to Function, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 50 (2013) (“[L]imited liability is thought to offer two main
advantages. First, it minimizes the risks associated with investing and thereby assists in
aggregating capital. Second, it reduces the need for investors to monitor managers and
fellow investors, which, in turn, reduces the cost of investing.”).
96
See Stefan J. Padfield, The Separation of Church and For-Profit Corporations,
BUSINESS LAW PROF BLOG (Feb. 23, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business
_law/2014/02/the-separation-of-church-and-for-profit-corporations.html (“[B]ecause of
their unique ability to consolidate power, corporations are aptly considered by many to be
one of Madison’s feared factions that threaten to undermine the very democracy that
supports their creation and growth.”).
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also to further individual political and religious beliefs, the state may
properly assert that this was never a part of the bargain and thus the shareholders are over-reaching.97 In fact, for the state to essentially subsidize
the furtherance of shareholders’ religious beliefs at the expense of employees
implicates the separation of church and state and risks running afoul of the
Establishment Clause.98
On the other hand, striking the right balance between shareholder empowerment and managerial discretion, as well as experimenting with secular corporate purpose to maximize overall gain, seems perfectly within the
proper scope of the laboratory of the states. This view of the state as the creator of the corporate form, which it then contracts with the incorporators to use
for the general welfare, is representative of concession theory.99 Thus, of
all the models and theories discussed herein, it is arguably only concession
theory that has the ability to both provide a normative basis for mandatory
97

Cf. Ian S. Speir, Constitutional and Statutory Reservation Clauses and Constitutional Requirements of General Laws with Respect to Corporations: The Fifty States and
the District of Columbia (Apr. 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1820868
(“Reservation clauses, reserving to the legislature a power to amend or repeal corporate
charters, are included in the constitutions or corporation statutes of 49 states and the
District of Columbia.”); Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 69 (1992) (“Advocates of Contract
Clause protection for shareholders are aware of the ‘reserve’clauses resulting from Dartmouth College, but they appear to underestimate the full import of these powers. States
have ‘reserved’the freedom ... to ‘impair’the rights of shareholders ....”).
98
Cf. Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G.Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 343, 343–44 (2014) (“If RFRA exemptions from the mandate violate the
Establishment Clause, then that is the end of RFRA exemptions, regardless of whether
for-profit corporations are persons exercising religion, the mandate is a substantial burden
on employers’anti-contraception beliefs, or the mandate is not the least restrictive means
of protecting a compelling government interest.”); Sasha Volokh, Is RFRA Unconstitutional?,
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 1, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh
-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/01/is-rfra-unconstitutional/ (“Justice Stevens is the only one who
ever showed any sympathy for the argument that RFRA violates the Establishment
Clause .... Nonetheless, Justice Stevens may have been right as a philosophical matter ….”).
99
Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 549.
Proponents of shareholder wealth maximization typically treat corporate governance as a species of private law, such that the separation of
ownership and control does not in and of itself justify state intervention
in corporate governance. In contrast, stakeholderists commonly treat
corporate governance as a species of public law, such that the separation of ownership and control becomes principally a justification for
regulating corporate governance so as to achieve social goals unrelated
to corporate profitability.
Id.
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secular CSR, while at the same time restricting the ability of individuals to
leverage the corporate subsidy (which has arguably been provided solely
to further societal economic growth) for personal religious evangelism,
and there is nothing inherently “inconsistent” about this line-drawing .100
Finally, it has been suggested that Hobby Lobby meaningfully expanded
the ability of corporations to pursue CSR activities. However, I believe the
better view is that any expansion in this area attributable to Hobby Lobby
is limited to closely held corporations with no complaining shareholders.
Thus, while Lyman Johnson argued that in order “[t]o hold that close corporations were ‘free’ from the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care
Act … the Court … had to determine that, under state corporate law, such
companies are likewise ‘free’ from some imagined state legal mandate to
maximize profits,”101 Stephen Bainbridge noted that “Hobby Lobby ... is
best understood as recognizing the well-established principle that shareholders of a closely held corporation can alter the default rules of corporate
law, including the issue of corporate purpose”and that Hobby Lobby should
not be understood as changing the default rule, “especially by way of what
is arguably dicta.”102 I agree with Bainbridge here because at the very least
the doctrine of waste should allow any shareholder who disagreed to challenge corporate conduct that was pursued for purely religious or social
responsibility purposes without any claimed shareholder wealth benefit,103
and I do not believe Hobby Lobby changed that rule.104 Thus, the rules of
100

Some have argued that forcing individuals to choose between operating a business
in the for-profit corporate form or staying true to their individual First Amendment rights
in all their business activities constitutes the imposition of an unconstitutional condition
on the privilege of incorporation. I have addressed this challenge elsewhere. See Padfield,
Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7 (“[T]here are at least five good reasons
to conclude that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine would not constitute an insurmountable obstacle to the viability of concession theory.”).
101
Haskell Murray, Lyman Johnson—Hobby Lobby, a Landmark Corporate Law Decision, BUSINESS LAW PROF BLOG (July 2, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/busi
ness_law/2014/07/lyman-johnson-hobby-lobby-a-landmark-corporate-law-decision.html.
102
Stephen Bainbridge, Does Hobby Lobby Sound a Death Knell for Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co.?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (July 3, 2014, 2:35 PM), http://www.professor
bainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/07/does-hobby-lobby-sound-a-death-knell
-for-dodge-v-ford-motor-co.html.
103
See Jonathan Romiti, Note, Playing Politics with Shareholder Value: The Case for
Applying Fiduciary Law to Corporate Political Donations Post-Citizens United, 53 B.C.
L. REV. 737, 740 (2012) (“Through suits based on the fiduciary duty of loyalty and the doctrine of waste, shareholders should be entitled to sue directors for use of the corporation’s
wealth for what is often a nonbusiness purpose.”).
104
See Joshua Fershee, Does Hobby Lobby Create a First Amendment Out for Fiduciary Duties?, BUSINESS LAW PROF BLOG (June 30, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com
/business_law/2014/06/does-hobby-lobby-create-a-first-amendment-out-for-fiduciary-du
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shareholder wealth maximization and shareholder wealth satisfaction that I
discussed earlier are best understood to remain the dominant default rules
even after Hobby Lobby, and the problems this creates for mandatory CSR
also remain, with concession theory thus also continuing to remain the
most viable theory of corporate personality or governance to challenge
that norm.105
B. Aggregate Theory
In the 1886 Supreme Court case of Santa Clara County v. Southern
Pacific Railroad Co., the Court famously asserted that:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion
that it does.106

I have previously noted that “Morton Horwitz has convincingly argued
that [Santa Clara] represented a shift to the aggregate view of the corporation.”107 The aggregate view rejected the fiction of the corporation as an
ties.html (“Can a corporation now choose to give a majority of its funds to a church, even
if it harms the entity? I think no ....”).
105
I have a friend who is fond of saying that all questions regarding the proper role of
corporations in society are ultimately questions of political philosophy. For example, while
concession theory may work as an argument against the majority’s opinion in Citizens
United because the government in that case was clearly trying to regulate the corporation
(see discussion of Citizens United infra Part IV), things get a bit trickier in Hobby Lobby
because the government there is represented in both the ACA (imposing regulation) and
RFRA (providing exemption). Put another way, even if one agrees that concession theory
is the most accurate of the available theories of the corporation because it most realistically reflects the dominant role of the state in corporate issues, one is still left with the
question of how the state should exercise its authority. At the risk of leaving an elephant
standing unaddressed in the living room, I will beg the reader’s indulgence in accepting
my claim that wandering down this particular rabbit hole is simply beyond the scope of
this Essay. Ultimately, the fact that questions may remain to be answered after choosing
concession theory as the best theory for mandatory CSR purposes does not equate to
making that choice pointless. It is doubtful that any of the theories under consideration
here answer all relevant questions, nor would denying any role for corporate theory at all
be likely to stop the debating. On this last point, I stand with those who argue that corporate personality theory matters. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 68 (1992) (arguing that
“the rise of a natural entity theory of the corporation was a major factor in legitimating
big business and ... none of the other theoretical alternatives could provide as much
sustenance to newly organized, concentrated enterprise”).
106
Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
107
Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 336.

2015]

CSR & CONCESSION THEORY

27

artificial entity that was promoted by concession theory, and instead focused
on the property rights of the underlying shareholders to conceive of the
corporation as simply an association of individuals.108 Furthermore, “[m]odern
nexus-of-contracts theory is understood by many to carry on this aggregate
theory tradition,”109 and shareholder primacy is fairly understood as the
corporate governance correlate.110
Importantly, contractarianism eschews government regulation. As Stephen Bainbridge has noted:
The contractarian model has important implications for a range of corporate law issues, most obviously the debate over the proper role of
mandatory legal rules. As a positive matter, contractarians contend that
corporate law is comprised mainly of default rules, from which shareholders are free to depart, rather than mandatory rules. As a normative
matter, contractarians think this preference for default rules is just as it
should be.111

Thus, because mandatory CSR likely requires meaningful government
regulation, and aggregate theory is commonly associated with a de-regulatory
108

Id.
Id. at 337.
110
Cf. David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 236 n.140
(1990) (“Advocates of shareholder primacy, while accepting an aggregate theory of the
corporation, have responded to arguments in favor of broader participation in corporate
governance by focusing on the unique position that shareholders occupy within the network of contracts.”). It should be noted that all three of the primary theories of corporate
governance discussed herein routinely claim contractarian roots. Cf. David G. Yosifon,
The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social Responsibility After
Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1200 (2010) (“In the canonical account, firm directors are charged with running the firm in the best interests of shareholders not because
shareholders ‘own’ the corporation, but because shareholder primacy in firm governance is
the ‘term’ that all of the parties to the corporate nexus would agree to if they actually sat
around a bargaining table and negotiated with each other.”).
111
Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 577–78; see also id. at 584 (“One of the chief tenets of
contractarianism is that the law ought to facilitate private ordering.”). Cf. Larry E. Ribstein,
Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 82, 83 (1991)
(rejecting “the conception of limited liability as a state-conferred privilege” and explaining that this is important because “recognition of limited liability as the product of private
ordering compels acceptance of the contract theory of the corporation”); William A.
Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J.
1521, 1525 (1982) (“[T]his Article rejects the notion that corporate status is a ‘privilege.’
It views corporation codes as a device ‘to reduce the transaction costs of private bargaining by providing a code of standard legal arrangements.’”). But see Bainbridge, supra
note 1, at 585 (“Yet, the law should not always facilitate private ordering. In particular,
regulatory intervention may be appropriate where there is a market failure. Welfare economics classically recognizes four basic sources of market failures: (1) producer monopoly,
(2) public goods, (3) information asymmetries, and (4) externalities.”).
109
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agenda, advocates of mandatory CSR will again need to look elsewhere for
theoretical support.112
C. Real/Natural Entity Theory
As I have previously written:
The problem with aggregate theory … is that the primary theoretical
justification for limited liability is the separation of ownership from
control by way of the statutorily designated overseers of corporate activity—the board of directors. If one ignores this separation and boils
the corporation down to its shareholder owners, then one is essentially
back to a form of general partnership where all the owners are personally liable for the debts of the business. Thus, the need arose for another
theory, and real/natural entity theory filled that need by aligning the
corporation with the board of directors.113

As opposed to aggregate theory, which essentially boils the corporation down to an association of shareholders, real entity theory (also known
as natural entity theory) places the board of directors at the control center
of the corporation.114 This view is certainly not without its critics,115 but it
112

Perhaps aggregate theory could support mandatory CSR as a normative matter if it
(1) denied shareholders the status of owners and (2) viewed the status quo of the shareholder wealth maximization norm as a function of market failure via regulatory capture
and the race to the bottom. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 547–48. (“[T]he ‘nexus of
contracts’ or ‘contractarian’ model ... denies that shareholders own the corporation. Instead, it
argues that shareholders are merely one of many factors of production bound together in
a complex web of explicit and implicit contracts. Contractarian theory nevertheless
continues to treat directors and officers as contractual agents of the shareholders, with
fiduciary obligations to maximize shareholder wealth.”).
113
Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 337.
114
Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 553 (“[J]ust as the law treats the corporation as
[an] entity for some purposes, the contractarian model should treat the corporation as a
real entity to the limited extent necessitated by the need for an actual nexus within the
firm capable of contracting with factors of production.”); id. at 560 (“[T]o the limited
extent to which the corporation is properly understood as a real entity, it is the board of
directors that personifies the corporate entity.”); Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 290
(“[T]he board of directors is the ultimate decision-making body of the corporation (and in
a sense is the group most appropriately identified with ‘the corporation’) ….”) (quoting
Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 56 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985)).
115
Cf. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 331 n.17.
This decision [to equate director primacy and team production theory
with real entity theory] is controversial at the very least because Stephen Bainbridge, the scholar most commonly associated with directorprimacy theory, rejects the characterization. See [Stefan J. Padfield, The
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is a useful way of distinguishing shareholder primacy from the director
primacy and team production models in the corporate personality context,
since all three claim contractarian and agency roots.116 Regardless, while
real entity theory arguably provides more support for voluntary CSR than
aggregate theory (at least when real entity theory is aligned with team
production theory), it still does not provide the theoretical support advocates
of mandatory CSR are looking for like concession theory can because it,
like aggregate theory, casts the corporation as a predominantly private
actor with essentially all the concomitant rights against regulatory restraint.117
IV. WHY CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY NEEDS CONCESSION THEORY
MORE THAN EVER POST CITIZENS UNITED
Some have argued that corporate personality theory is irrelevant to determining the proper rights and responsibilities of corporations. They point
to cases where the same personality theory has been used both to embolden and restrict corporations.118 What really matters, these critics argue, is
whether the goals of the relevant statute, for example, are advanced by
treating corporations one way or another—there is simply no reason to
always conceive of corporations as artificial entities or aggregates of
Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court's Campaign Finance Cases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 831, 843 n.41 (2013)] (citing “our
multi-blog post discussions of the issue”). But see id. (“On the other
hand, Lynn Stout [one of the scholars most commonly associated with
team-production theory] responded ... with an e-mail asserting that my
description of the issue was ‘as well put as I’ve seen it.’”).
Id.

116

Cf. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 7, at 338 (identifying
“three versions of real entity theory …: the organic view, the representative view, and the
pragmatic view”).
117
Id. at 335.
118
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L.
REV. 999, 1022–23 (2010) (“In 1926, John Dewey published an article in the Yale Law
Journal in which he dismisses as irrelevant the debate among the aggregate, artificial
entity, and real entity views of the corporation. These views, he explains, could be deployed to suit any purpose; and he uses examples relying on the cyclical nature of these
theories. His conclusion is that theory should be abandoned for an examination of reality.”) (citing John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35
YALE L.J. 655, 669, 673 (1926)). But see Horwitz, supra note 101, at 68 (“I wish to
dispute Dewey’s conclusion that particular conceptions of corporate personality were
used just as easily to limit as to enhance corporate power. I hope to show that, for example, the rise of a natural entity theory of the corporation was a major factor in legitimating
big business and that none of the other theoretical alternatives could provide as much
sustenance to newly organized, concentrated enterprise.”).
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shareholders. 119 However, as I have previously argued, the blockbuster
Citizens United120 case provides a sound basis for concluding that corporate personality theory still carries great weight—even when, as there, the
Justices deny it.121
It may seem counterintuitive to cite a case wherein the majority was silent on the issue of corporate personality theory, and the dissent expressly
disavowed any role therefor,122 as standing for the proposition that corporate personality theory matters. However, the academic commentary on
Citizens United leaves little doubt that corporate personality theory was
reinvigorated by the case123 and, perhaps more importantly, the opinion generated intense interest in corporate personality by politicians and voters.124
119

See Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm—From Nature to
Function, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 43 (2013) (“[A] legal entity should be viewed simply as a
tool by which the legislature has chosen to enable individuals to pursue certain collective
(or, in the case of a one-man-company, individual) goals in a more effective and convenient
manner. Beyond this definition, law—in contrast perhaps to sociology or philosophy—
does not need to assess the nature of the firm.”); Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1631 (2011) (“[A] metaphor or philosophical
conception of the corporation is not helpful for the type of functional analysis that the
Court should conduct. The Court should consider the purpose of the constitutional right at
issue, and whether it would promote the objectives of that right to provide it to the corporation—and thereby to the people underlying the corporation.”).
120
See Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court's Campaign Finance Cases, supra note 7, at 833 (“In Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court ruled that corporate political speech
could not be regulated on the basis of corporate status alone.”).
121
See id. (“Despite protestations to the contrary ... a closer reading of the Citizens
United opinion reveals that both the majority and dissent not only adopted diverging
theories of the corporation, but that those theories were likely dispositive.”). A similar
role for corporate personality theory can be seen in Hobby Lobby, though perhaps at a
more muted level. See generally Padfield, The Role of Corporate Personality Theory in
Hobby Lobby, supra note 89 (noting that while Justice Alito’s majority opinion equated
the closely held corporation with its controlling shareholders, and thus granted the corporation standing to claim interference with its free exercise rights, Justice Ginsburg argued
in dissent that the corporation could not, as an artificial entity, exercise religion).
122
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 971 n.72 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“Nothing in this analysis turns on
whether the corporation is conceptualized as a grantee of a state concession, ... a nexus of
explicit and implicit contracts, ... a mediated hierarchy of stakeholders,...or any other
recognized model.” (internal citations omitted)).
123
See Stephen Bainbridge, Citizens United v. FEC: Stevens' Pernicious Version of
the Concession Theory, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 21, 2010, 4:05 PM), http://
www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/citizens-united-v-fecstevens-pernicious-version-of-the-concession-theory.html.
124
See Ronald J. Colombo, The Corporation as a Tocquevillian Association, 85
TEMP. L. REV. 1, 25 n.180 (2012) (“[S]ome in Congress have pushed for legislation that
would purportedly circumvent Citizens United, and some have even called for a constitutional amendment to reverse the decision.”). Cf. Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 303 n.13
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In particular, David Yosifon has argued that even if one did not favor
some type of mandatory CSR pre-Citizens United, that case should cause
some reconsideration of that position:
[I]f we cannot as a matter of constitutional law keep corporations out of
our democracy, then we must as a matter of corporate law have more democracy in our corporations. After Citizens United, we must begin to
restructure corporate law to require boards of directors to actively attend to
the interests of multiple stakeholders at the level of firm governance.125

This is so, according to Yosifon, because combining a shareholder
wealth maximization norm with unfettered political speech rights virtually
guarantees maximizing the negative externalities created by corporations.
Yosifon describes the relevant process as follows:
[C]onventional corporate theory does recognize that because of their
relative power, firms can sometimes overreach with respect to nonshareholders by manipulating wages, prices, and perceptions. Even
where such problems emerge, however, the standard account insists
that the solution does not reside in altering the shareholder primacy
norm at the heart of firm governance. Instead, firms should be restrained from engaging in such exploitative conduct by external governmental regulation, such as labor laws, consumer protection statutes,
and environmental codes…. But corporations, in general, enjoy competitive advantages over consumers and workers in the competition for
regulatory favor.... Therefore, it is illogical to expect that “regulation”
will be able to contain the excesses of the shareholder primacy corporation. Defenders of shareholder primacy in firm governance rarely address the public choice problem directly, but when they do, they voice a
position similar to that of liberal critics of corporations—they claim
that the proper response to the problem is to insulate the political and
regulatory realms from corporate influence. But conservative and critical corporate scholars have failed to bring corporate theory together
with free speech analysis and have failed to recognize that the First
Amendment, and the values it represents, forecloses the kind of regulation that would be necessary to insulate politics from corporate influence and vindicate shareholder primacy.126
(“[P]ublic opinion, which ultimately makes law, has made and is today making substantial strides in the direction of a view of the business corporation as an economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making function.”) (quoting E. Merrick
Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1146–
48 (1932)); id. at 325, n.202 (“[U]nder a mediating hierarchy system, team members’
rewards from team production will be in part determined by political power.”).
125
David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1197 (2010).
126
Id. at 1200–04. Shortly before this Essay went to print, a series of papers were published advancing these arguments further. See Leo E. Strine & Nicholas Walter, Conservative
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Thus, to whatever extent concession theory may have been marginalized pre-Citizens United, it is now once again arguably relevant due to it
being the best suited among the corporate governance and personality theories to support a movement to rein in the negative externalities flowing
from Citizens United as described by Yosifon, either directly via legislative attempts to overturn at least some portion of the opinion, or indirectly via
legislative mandates for increased corporate accountability to stakeholders.
V. CRITICISMS
There should be no doubt that imposing mandatory consideration of
stakeholders on directors in carrying out their oversight responsibilities
carries meaningful risk of undermining the wealth creation and innovation
benefits of the corporate form as currently constituted. 127 This general
Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United (Harv. Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. Discussion Paper No. 788, Aug. 2014),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2481061 (“Citizens United … undercuts conservative
corporate theory’s reliance upon regulation as an answer to corporate externality risk, and
strengthens the argument of its rival theory that corporate managers must consider the
best interests of employees, consumers, communities, the environment, and society—and
not just stockholders—when making business decisions.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Corporate Social Responsibility in the Night Watchman State: A Comment on Strine &
Walker (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 14-12, Sept. 2014), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2494003 (“This essay argues that Strine and Walker’s analysis
is flawed in three major respects.”); David G. Yosifon, The Citizens United Gambit in
Corporate Theory: A Reply to Bainbridge on Strine and Walter (Santa Clara Univ. Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 4-14, Oct. 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2510967 (“In this brief essay, I criticize Bainbridge’s critique, and argue that the Citizens United gambit in corporate theory is indeed a compelling challenge to shareholder
primacy theory.”).
127
See D. Gordon Smith, Response: The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57
EMORY L.J. 985, 1008 (2008) (“The inevitable result would be an increase in the cost of
public equity capital that, in turn, might prompt many companies to search for a more
hospitable host for incorporation.”). But cf. Robert Ashford, A Socio-Economic Perspective on the Theory of the Corporation, the Duties of Corporate Fiduciaries, and the
Power of the State [working title], 11 (draft of July 4, 2014, on file with author) (noting
that “[w]hen engaging in corporate planning, corporate fiduciaries must generally delineate time horizons in connection with particular corporate plans” but arguing that when they
do so “their obligation is to maximize corporate wealth, not shareholder wealth (which
generally is dependent on factors distinct from the perpetual corporate interests)”).
Even shareholders who have no present intention of selling their shares
(and who may therefore be said to have a time horizon identical to the
corporation) may at any time come across a better investment opportunity. Selecting a time horizon for corporate wealth-maximization with
the intent of maximizing the particular wealth of any group of shareholders would risk failing to maximize wealth for (and therefore do
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criticism has been well vetted elsewhere, and I will not rehash the debate
here, though my declining to do so should not be construed as my being
dismissive of relevant concerns regarding statism. 128 However, I would
like to address a more recent criticism, which is that to the extent something like mandatory CSR is desirable, it is far better to experiment with
such a mandate using alternative entities where the potential costs are
minimized. Specifically, I am talking here about benefit corporations.129
At the very least, one response to this claim is that it effectively
amounts to yet another marginalization of CSR.130 While perhaps more facially impressive than permissive constituency statutes, relegating CSR to
specifically designated “social enterprise” forms leaves the vast majority
economic injustice to) others. There is no stable, unchanging aggregate
of shareholders with a discernible, homogenous time horizon for which
wealth can be maximized at every point in time … no stable group of
shareholders to which corporate wealth-maximizing fiduciary duties
can be held to run.
Id.

128

See, e.g., Harry G. Hutchison, Choice, Progressive Values, and Corporate Law: A
Reply to Greenfield, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 437, 438 (2010) (“[P]rivate decision making ...
typically results in better outcomes than ... public/regulatory decision making ... [and]
effort[s] to diminish respect for choice and liberty of contract correlates with paternalistic
efforts to enlarge the power of government ... [which] risks government failure as well as
the sub-ordination of more citizens.”).
129
See generally J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited
Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 23 (2011) (“Many social entrepreneurs
believe that their fourth-sector enterprises need to be seen as entirely unique charitable
and capitalistic entities, to be differentiated from nonprofits, which are perceived to be
less efficient than for-profits, and to be differentiated from for-profits, which are fixated
primarily on financial value.”). Cf. Ian Kanig, Note, Sustainable Capitalism Through the
Benefit Corporation: Enforcing the Procedural Duty of Consideration to Protect NonShareholder Interests, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 863 (2013).
Critics, however, question the substantive enforcement mechanism of
the benefit corporation, a third-party auditing standard that they selfapply to evaluate whether they are effectively providing for the public
good. This Note concurs, but proposes a statutory construction and litigation strategy that courts and plaintiffs can apply to ensure that benefit
corporations do not shirk their duty to the public. Through the express
private right of action known as the “benefit enforcement proceeding,”
this Note contends that shareholders and dissenting directors can and
should seek injunctive relief for breaches of the procedural “duty of
consideration of non-shareholder interests” by the corporation and its
board of directors.
Id.
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Cf. Amelia Young, CSR is being marginalized, FINANCIAL POST (last updated
Jan. 5, 2009, 2:03 PM), http://www.financialpost.com/being+marginalized/1096752/story
.html?__federated=1 (“CSR is here to stay; however, the face of it needs to evolve from
being a niche discipline to a core element of sound business practice.”).
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of the most important entities free to continue placing shareholder wealth
ahead of social responsibility. Thus, accepting a benefit corporation limitation on mandatory CSR could amount to creating CSR “ghettos” in the
vast economic landscape.131
CONCLUSION
The three primary models of corporate governance are director primacy,
shareholder primacy, and team production theory. While successful to
varying degrees in accurately describing some portion of the current state
of actual affairs, as well as advancing at least defensible normative positions, none of them respond to the needs of those who would advocate for
corporate social responsibility in the form of mandatory provisions such as
constituency statutes that are enforceable by stakeholders. Rather, such
advocates must look elsewhere, and this Essay has argued that corporate
personality theory, particularly concession theory, may provide a strong
foundation from which to advance the goal of more socially responsible
corporations. In addition, David Yosifon has noted that challenges to the
shareholder wealth maximization norm have been absent from what otherwise were significant corporate governance reforms in the forms of
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, at least in part because of the lack of
any compelling narrative to support a shift away from shareholder wealth
maximization.132 Concession theory may well provide the needed narrative to overcome the hegemony of shareholder wealth maximization and
the theories of corporate governance that dominate the current debate to
the exclusion of enforceable corporate social responsibility norms.
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Cf. Brian Walker, Don't Bother with the "Green" Consumer, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Jan. 23, 2008, 9:00 AM), http://www.hbrgreen.org/2008/01/dont_bother_with_the_green
_con.html (“Small, streamlined green brands that truly appeal to the environmentalist consumer
can’t reach the mainstream. Those companies get stuck in a green ghetto—virtuous, but
limited in scope.”).
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